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International Lending Supervision
Robert R. Bench and Dorothy A. Sable*
The international debt crisis and other tumultuous events have
resulted in significant changes in the supervision of U.S. banks' inter-
national lending.' In particular, new requirements have been ap-
plied to international loans since the passage of the International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA).2 Because these changes
and new requirements affect, for the most part, all international
loans and not merely those to borrowers in less developed countries
(LDCs), it is important for banking law practitioners to understand
these changes.
Although supervision of U.S. banks' international lending had
been an important part of federal banking regulation since the
1960s,3 the Mexican debt crisis in August, 1982 prompted the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) (the agencies), to review their existing pol-
icies and procedures in order to strengthen supervision in an era of
international debt problems. Congress, then in the midst of consid-
ering the Administration's request for approval of an increased
quota at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was equally con-
cerned about the risks to the U.S. banking system posed by foreign
loans .4
* Mr. Bench is the Deputy Comptroller for International Relations and Financial
Evaluation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Ms. Sable is an attorney specializ-
ing in international banking issues. The views expressed are the authors' and do not nec-
essarily represent the views of the Comptroller's Office.
I The terms "international lending," "international loans" and "foreign loans" basi-
cally mean extensions of credit to a foreign government, or to an individual, a corporation,
or other entity not a citizen of, resident in, or organized or incorporated in the United
States. 12 C.F.R. § 20.7(d) (1986). International loans include those denominated in the
local currency of the country of the borrower, but more typically, such loans are denomi-
nated in dollars or one of the other international reserve currencies.
2 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (Supp. 11 1984).
3 For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) established an
international division and an overseas examination program (1965), opened a London of-
fice (1972), required global consolidated accounting and disclosure (1973), began evaluat-
ing total loans to foreign governments (1974), required semi-annual reporting of bank
exposures in foreign countries (1977), and revised rules pertaining to international lend-
ing (1979).
4 See generally S. REP. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1983) [hereinafter S.
REP.] and H.R. REP. No. 175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-38 (1983) [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
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In the spring of 1983, as a result of their review and in response
to congressional concerns, the agencies announced a five-point pro-
gram to strengthen the supervision of international lending.5 The
program consisted of: (1) improving the existing system of country
risk examination and evaluation in order to alert bank management
to country risk and concentration problems, and to better evaluate
bank capital adequacy in terms of country exposure concentration;
(2) increasing disclosure of banks' country exposure by requiring re-
ports on a quarterly, rather than a semi-annual basis; (3) requiring
special reserves for certain international loans; (4) establishing su-
pervisory rules in bank accounting for fees received in connection
with international loans; and (5) strengthening existing international
cooperation with both foreign banking regulators and the IMF.
The agencies specifically rejected country lending limits per se,
and advised that no new statutory authority was necessary to enable
the agencies to implement the program. Although Congress sup-
ported the program proposed by the agencies, it did not agree that
statutory authorities or statutory requirements were unnecessary. In
view of U.S. banks' substantial international lending exposure, par-
ticularly their exposure on loans to the LDCs, the banking commit-
tees of both the Senate and House agreed that specific legislative
action was needed to mandate a permanent improvement in the su-
pervision and regulation of international lending. 6
Although the Senate adopted the program as announced by the
agencies, 7 the'House, initially, made several more stringent modifi-
cations. These included vesting authority in the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)8 to develop capital ade-
quacy standards for country exposure concentrations, and extending
the proposed system of special reserves to include uniform reserves
for all loans needing rescheduling, rather than just those to which
rescheduling was deemed unlikely and/or noncompliance with
rescheduling was found. 9 The House-proposed measures were not
adopted and the final legislationi ° embodies the agencies' five-point
program and certain additional measures, in a series of legislative
The House Report was particularly critical of the agencies' supervision of international
lending,
5 The program was set forth in a joint memorandum accompanying an April 7, 1983
letter from the Comptroller of the Currency, the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System to Senator Jake Garn, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs.
6 S. REP., supra note 4, at 13; H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 37-38.
7 S. 695, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. Title III (1983).
8 The Council consists of representatives of the three federal banking agencies plus
representatives of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the National Credit Union
Administration. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 3301-08 (1982).
9 H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 39-41.
10 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (Supp. 11 1984).
[VOL. I I
INTERNATIONAL LENDING SUPERVISION
requirements: (1) improved international coordination of supervi-
sory policies and practices with respect to international lending;
(2) strengthened domestic supervision of international lending by
U.S. banks; (3) special reserves; (4) rules on accounting for interna-
tional loan fees; (5) increased disclosure requirements; and (6) for-
eign loan evaluations."
I. International Supervisory Cooperation
Although effective cooperation among bank supervisors interna-
tionally has existed since the early 1970s, 12 the importance of such
cooperation and coordination of policies was specifically recognized
by Congress in ILSA. Section 3901(b) requires that: "The Federal
banking agencies shall consult with the banking supervisory authori-
ties of other countries to reach understandings aimed at achieving
the adoption of effective and consistent supervisory policies and
practices with respect to international lending."' 3
It is noteworthy that the statute itself uses the term "under-
standings" because legally controlling agreements regulating trans-
national banking operations are the exception rather than the rule.
The fact that agreements lacking legal force and effect are generally
nonexistent does not mean, however, that there are no "understand-
ings" having a practical effect on the conduct of international bank-
ing operations. 14
Moreover, although there are no transnational supervisory bod-
ies, a number of cooperative international bank supervisory groups
exist. These groups typically are composed of the central banking
and bank supervisory authorities (when not one and the same) of
each of the member countries in the particular group. International
bank supervisory groups have been formed both by countries with
related interests (for example, the industrial countries represented in
the Basle Supervisors' Committee, or countries allowing offshore
banking represented in the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors),
and by countries in the same geographic area (such as the Latin
American supervisors' group). Many countries, particularly the
United States, are members of or participants in more than one of
these groups. In addition, all of the groups are'in frequent contact
with one another so that principles or supervisory techniques stud-
I Id. §§ 3903-06, 3908. The Act also includes a provision requiring the agencies to
establish minimum levels of capital necessary for all banks under their supervision. Id.
§ 3907 (1982). This provision will not be discussed here since it is not specifically applica-
ble to international lending.
12 The Cooke Committee was established in 1974. See infra notes 16-17 and accom-
panying text.
13 12 U.S.C. § 3901(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
14 See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Concordat, a
set of principles developed by and agreed upon by members of the Cooke Committee.
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ied, developed, or adopted in one group are rapidly communicated
to each of the other groups.
Despite the fact that none of these groups, with the exception of
the Banking Advisory Committee of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), has a legal charter or other international or national
legal mandate, the groups nonetheless exert a considerable influence
over the conduct of transnational banking operations. They do so in
a number of ways.
First, through the adoption of agreed-upon supervisory princi-
ples, such as the framework for shared supervisory responsibilities
for the operations of multinational banking organizations set out in
the Concordat of the Cooke Committee.' 5
Second, by facilitating the exchange of information on require-
ments and supervisory procedures for banking institutions in each of
the member countries and working toward consensus on minimum
international requirements for multinational banking organizations.
Third, by facilitating the exchange of information between bank-
ing supervisors concerning individual multinational banking
organizations.
Multinational banking organizations are not yet subject to bind-
ing international rules on such matters as capital, lending limits or
permissible investments. It must be remembered, however, that
before 1974, few organizations existed to facilitate coordination of
regulatory requirements, and banking supervisors were primarily do-
mestically-oriented. The considerable progress in international su-
pervisory cooperation that has been made thus far is due to the
formation of international groups of supervisors and the efforts of
their members. The most prominent of these groups is the Cooke
Committee.
A. International Supervisory Cooperation: A Comparison of the
Informal and the Formal Models
1. Informal Cooperation: The Basle Supervisors' Committee (The
Cooke Committee)
The Basle Supervisors' Committee, the best known of the
groups, was established by the central bank governors of the Group
of Ten countries and Switzerland at the end of 1974. This was ac-
complished by creation of a standing committee, the Committee on
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices (the Committee). t 6
Since its creation, the Committee has met regularly three or four
15 See id.
16 The current members are: Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and West
Germany. The supervisory authorities of several of these countries also meet and form the
Contact Group of EEC supervisory authorities. That Group works closely with, and is
[VOL. I11
INTERNATIONAL LENDING SUPERVISION
times a year at the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, Swit-
zerland. The Committee has no formal "charter" or other legal
mandate. 17
The Committee's first achievement in improving the supervision
of international banking business was its agreement upon certain
principles set forth in the document known as the Concordat, issued
in 1975.18 As a result of ongoing work and discussions with other
supervisory authorities, the Concordat was revised in 1983.19 Two
major principles of both the original and revised Concordat are that
no aspect of a banking organization's operations should be un-
supervised, and that responsibilities for supervision of the solvency
and liquidity of banks' foreign operations should be allocated be-
tween host and headquarters' authorities, with full cooperation be-
tween the two. The most important principle of the revised
Concordat is that banking organizations should be supervised on a
consolidated basis by their headquarters' authority. The revised
Concordat is being implemented in the Basle Committee's member
countries and has been endorsed by other supervisors worldwide.
The Committee has undertaken studies of several topics con-
cerning problems affecting banks operating internationally, includ-
ing the supervision of banks' foreign exchange positions, the
monitoring of country risk, control of country exposure by interna-
tional banks, and off-balance sheet risks. Currently under considera-
tion is the capital adequacy of banks operating internationally and
convergence towards a broad, common definition of capital for su-
pervisory purposes. The Committee members concur that the capi-
tal positions of banks operating internationally should be
strengthened and on no account allowed to deteriorate.
In addition, the Committee has encouraged contacts and coop-
eration between its members and other bank supervisory authorities.
It circulates information on its work to supervisors throughout the
world and actively seeks their input. It has sponsored and coordi-
nated studies of various countries' bank regulatory systems. Finally,
formally recognized by, the European Economic Community's Banking Advisory
Committee.
17 The existence and importance of the Committee was, however, indirectly recog-
nized by Congress in several sections of ILSA. For example, 12 U.S.C. § 3911 (Supp. II
1984) states: "[a]s one of the three Federal bank regulatory and supervisory agencies, and
as the insurer of the United States banks involved in international lending, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation shall be given equal representation with the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
on the Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices of the Group of Ten
Countries and Switzerland." Id.
18 The text of the first Concordat is reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 7, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 29 (1981).
19 The text of the revised Concordat is reprinted in Bank Administration Institute,
The New Concordat-Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, ISSUES IN BANK
REG., Summer 1984, at 25.
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the Committee sponsored worldwide conferences of banking super-
visors in 1979, 1981 and 1984.20
2. The EEC. Cooperation and Agreement Under a Legal
Framework
In contrast to informal cooperation between supervisors
through groups such as the Cooke Committee, the EEC can promote
harmonization of banking legislation and supervisory cooperation by
law, through the use of "Directives." Directives are orders of the
EEC Council, provided for in article 189 of the EEC Treaty, which
"bind any Member State to which they are addressed as to the result
to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as
to form and means."121 The treaty specifically provides for the free-
dom of banking institutions to be established and to provide services
in the Member States, 22  and for coordination of banking
legislation. 23
With respect to coordination of banking laws, the EEC's first
step was issuance of a Directive containing minimum requirements
for the establishment of banking institutions in the Member States,
and requiring that the Member States calculate, according to a uni-
form method, the solvency and liquidity of their banking institutions
for observation purposes. 24 The EEC permitted existing national
rules on reporting to remain in force.25
In 1983, the Council of Ministers approved a Directive requiring
supervision on a consolidated basis of banking institutions holding a
majority interest in another credit or financial institution. 26 This Di-
20 Other groups of international supervisors include the Commission of Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean Banking Supervisory and Inspection Authorities, with 23 members
from the area; the Expert Banking Group of the OECD consisting of supervisory officials
from the 24 industrialized countries; the Nordic Supervisory Group consisting of the bank-
ing authorities of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden; the Offshore Group of
Banking Supervisors, open to supervisors from the offshore banking centers who endorse
the principles of the revised Basle Concordat; the SEANZA Forum of Bank Supervisors
from the Indian sub-continent, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Basin; and the Gulf Coordi-
nating Council of Central Banks, which promotes contacts among banking authorities in
the Middle East.
21 Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 79 [hereinafter cited as
Treaty of Rome].
22 Id. arts. 52-66.
23 Id. art. 57. "[T]he Council . . .shall ... issue directives regarding the co-ordina-
tion of legislative and administrative provisions of Member States concerning the engage-
ment in and exercise of non-wage-earning activities. A unanimous vote shall be required
... on measures concerning the protection of savings, in particular the allotment of credit
and the banking profession .... Id.
24 First Council Directive of Dec. 12, 1977 on the Coordination of laws, regulations
and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit
institutions, art. 3, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 322) 30, 33-34 (1977).
25 Id. art. 6.
26 Council Directive of June 13, 1983 on the supervision of credit institutions on a
consolidated basis, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 18 (1983).
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rective also requires the Member States to eliminate all',legal obsta-
cles to the exchange of information necessary for consolidated
supervision.27
Although the EEC Treaty, particularly article 57,28 provides a
legal framework for coordinated international supervision in the
EEC, progress generally has not been more substantial or significant
than progress under the informal bank supervisors' groups. For ex-
ample, under articles 8 and 57 of the treaty, 29 the coordination of
banking legislation should have been accomplished by 1970. Coor-
dination and harmonization have proceeded slowly, however, in part
because objective criteria for matters such as capital ratios do not
exist, and it is necessary to reach mutual agreement on judgmental
standards. Moreover, harmonization of EEC standards must take ac-
count of other countries' requirements to prevent any competitive
disadvantage. On the positive side, however, this legal and institu-
tional framework actively supports and spurs the harmonization pro-
cess, and has at a minimum resulted in informal coordination of the
policies of the Member States' supervisory authorities.
B. Prospects for Future Action
Despite the progress made through international supervisory
cooperation, much remains to be done. Because an interdependent
multinational banking system with its mutual vulnerability is now a
reality, however, both banks and bank supervisors have a real incen-
tive to develop uniform, or at least harmonized, rules of the game.
The future agenda includes harmonizing consolidated accounting
and financial statements and establishing agreed-upon principles re-
garding liquidity, capital adequacy and its measurement, and treat-
ment of non-performing loans. Although disparities exist in all of
these areas, they are not so great as to foreclose the possibility of
agreement. Work on all of these issues is proceeding actively in the
international supervisors' groups and, given the incentives for pro-
gress, the ultimate goal of minimum international standards is not
beyond reach.
II. Federal Banking Agencies' Supervision of International Lending
U.S. banks' overseas assets exceed 300 billion dollars, and for-
eign assets often comprise a substantial portion of an individual
bank's total assets. Analyzing country risk-the whole spectrum of
risks that rise from the social, economic, legal, and political condi-
tions in a foreign country-is therefore an important concern to U.S.
27 Id.
28 Treaty of Rome, supra note 21, at art. 57.
29 Id. art. 8.
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bank supervisors. 30 Two supervisory approaches are used to assess
country risks. One approach categorizes international social-eco-
nomic-political risks into traditional U.S. bank supervisory classifica-
tions for asset quality.3 ' The second approach quantifies and
evaluates a bank's country exposure management system.
A. Supervisory Evaluations of Country Risks
In 1974, the OCC established a structured approach for assess-
ing foreign government loans in national banks' portfolios. The
OCC formed a Foreign Public Sector Credit Review Committee that
evaluated the credit facilities made available by national banks to for-
eign governments, their agencies, or their instrumentalities. 32 Dur-
ing 1979, the Federal Reserve and FDIC joined the Comptroller in
establishing the Interagency Country Exposure Review Committee
(ICERC). This shifted the supervisory focus from classifying specific
foreign public sector borrowers to evaluating banks' transfer risk.33
The purpose of ICERC is to evaluate the ability of countries to gen-
erate foreign exchange necessary to enable borrowers in those coun-
tries to repay debt denominated in other than local currency. The
ICERC also establishes categorizations to be uniformly applied by
the three agencies in the examination of all insured U.S. banks.3 4
The ICERC is comprised of nine federal bank examiners, three
from each agency, 35 who base their assessments and classifications
on a wide assortment of data and information. First, the ICERC re-
ceives detailed country studies prepared by the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. The studies discuss economic, social, and political risk factors
30 It is also important to Congress. ILSA requires the Federal banking agencies, in
accordance with their five point program, to "evaluate banking institution foreign country
exposure and transfer risk for use in ... examination and supervision [and] ... assure that
factors such as foreign country exposure and transfer risk are taken into account in evalu-
ating the adequacy of the [bank's] capital .... 12 U.S.C. § 3903 (Supp. 11 1984).
31 Loans and other assets considered problematical from a credit standpoint are
"classified" by bank examiners into different categories depending upon the degree of risk
of loss which they pose. See COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL BANK EXAMINERS
§ 215.1 (Aug. 1985). Loans and other assets that appear sound and likely to be repaid in
accordance with their terms are not classified. The amount of classified assets in relation
to a bank's total assets and capital is a critical factor in evaluating a bank's condition and
determining whether corrective supervisory action is necessary. Id. § 503.
32 For a full discussion of the Comptroller's approach and why it was necessary, see
Bench, How the Comptroller of the Currency Analyzes Country Risk, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1977, at
47.
33 "Transfer risk" means the possibility that an asset cannot be serviced in the cur-
rency of payment because of a lack of, or restraints on the availability of, needed foreign
exchange in the country of the obligor. 12 C.F.R. § 20.7(h) (1986). The reasons for the
formation of ICERC and its emphasis on transfer risk are discussed in A New Supervisory
Approach to Foreign Lending, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV., Spring 1978, at 1.
34 ICERC classifications also form the basis for special reserve requirements. See infra
notes 40-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves.
35 This composition reflects the fact that all decisions on loan classifications are made
by bank examiners.
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in a country, and provide statistical information about a country's
external debt, balance of payments, and general economic condi-
tions. Second, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York prepares and
sends a list to the ICERC that statistically ranks countries by ability
to service external obligations. Third, the ICERC members visit U.S.
money center banks to review the banks' country files and discuss
country conditions with the banks' senior international officers. Fi-
nally, the examiners gather U.S. government information about
countries to confirm other information ICERC has received. U.S.
government sources can also reveal any bilateral or multilateral fi-
nancial assistance that may be in progress for a particular country.
ICERC meets in Washington, D.C. three times a year to assess
country risk. 36 The Committee evaluates the information it has gath-
ered and then categorizes countries on the basis of economic-social-
political conditions that may affect the country's flow of foreign ex-
change necessary to repay U.S. banks' exposures in that country.
ICERC may determine that one category applies to all U.S. bank
loans in a country, or that several categories apply depending on the
types of maturities of exposures U.S. banks have in the country.3 7
The ICERC country categorizations are:
(1). Strong. The country does not experience economic, social, or
political problems which could interrupt repayment of exter-
nal debt.
(2). Moderately Strong. The country experiences a limited number
of identifiable economic, social, or political problems that do
not presently threaten orderly repayment of external debt.
(3). Weak. The country experiences many economic, social, or
political problems. If not reversed, these problems could
threaten orderly repayment of external debt.
(4). Other Transfer Risk Problems. This category applies when:
a. A country is not complying with its external debt service
obligations, as evidenced by arrearages, forced restructur-
ing, or rollovers; the country is, however, taking positive
action to restore debt service through economic adjust-
ment measures, generally as part of the IMF program.
b. A country is meeting its debt obligations, but noncompli-
ance appears imminent.
c. A country has been classified previously, but recent debt
service performance indicates classification no longer is
warranted. For instance, the country is complying with the
terms of IMF and rescheduling programs, but sustained re-
sumption of orderly debt service needs to be
demonstrated.
(5). Substandard. This category applies when:
a. A country is not complying with its external service obliga-
tions, as evidenced by arrearages, forced restructuring, or
rollovers; and
36 Different countries are usually reviewed at each of the meetings.
37 For example, short term trade credits usually pose little risk and thus, may be ex-
cluded from the overall classification of loans to borrowers in a particular country.
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b. the country is not in the process of adopting an IMF or
other suitable economic adjustment program, or is not ad-
equately adhering to such a program; or
c. The country and its bank creditors have not negotiated a
viable rescheduling and are unlikely to do so in the near
future.
(6). Value Impaired. This category applies when a country has pro-
tracted arrearages, as indicated by more than one of the
following:
a. The country has not fully paid its interest for six months;
b. The country has not complied with IMF programs and
there is no immediate prospect for compliance;
c. The country has not met rescheduling terms for over one
year;
d. The country shows no definite prospects for an orderly
restoration of debt service in the near future.
(7). Loss. This category applies when the loan is considered uncol-
lectible and of such little value that its continued reporting as a
bankable asset is not warranted. An example is an outright
statement by a country which repudiates obligations to banks,
the IMF, or other lenders.
The ICERC categorizations are then provided to examiners who
use them in their reviews of banks' loan portfolios.
B. Supervisory Evaluations of Banks' Country Exposure Management
Systems
In addition to the ICERC assessments, the agencies also con-
sider bank management's policies for diversifying risks and the
bank's capacities for analyzing risks.
The ICERC categorizations of Substandard, Value Impaired,
and Loss are traditional U.S. supervisory classifications for problem
assets that are listed and discussed in a Report of Examination made
available to bank directors.3 8 In addition, when a bank has expo-
sures to Weak, Moderately Strong, or Strong countries, respectively,
in excess of 5%o, 10%o or 25% of a bank's capital funds, then the
examiners schedule the exposures in the Report of Examination as con-
centrations of risk for the information of bank directors. If Weak or
Moderately Strong exposures exceed 10% or 15%, respectively, of a
bank's capital funds, then the examiners discuss the exposures in de-
tail in their Report of Examination.
U.S. bank examiners also look at various country exposures and
individual assets in a bank's portfolio to determine whether there are
groups of country or borrower exposures at risk due to common eco-
nomic, social, or political factors. For instance, the cash flow of a
38 Assets in the Other Transfer Risk Problems category are not regarded as classified
assets. Rather, exposures in this category are considered by examiners as a judgmental




diverse group of borrowers may depend on the world market condi-
tions for the same commodity, such as oil, shipping services, or steel.
Therefore, when federal bank examiners find a group of a bank's as-
sets that rely on the same essential repayment factor, and when the
assets exceed 25% of a bank's capital funds, the examiners consider
the group exposure a concentration of risk. This concentration is
detailed in their Report of Examination. The 25% inclusion does not,
however, necessarily trigger examiner criticism. Any criticism of a
group concentration depends on the on-the-spot opinions of the
bank examiner, who decides whether a bank's concentration is im-
moderate or unwarranted. This decision is based upon the bank's
traditional relationship with the concentration, the level of bank
management's expertise, and the quality of a bank's supervision over
the concentration, evidenced by credit file analysis and the depth of
calling programs to the areas or borrowers.39
To reach supervisory conclusions about the adequacy of a
bank's management of country exposures, U.S. bank examiners eval-
uate a bank's international credit administration process during their
on-site examinations to determine: (1) if policies, practices, proce-
dures, and internal controls for country risk management are ade-
quate and prudent; (2) if bank officers are operating in conformance
with the guidelines the bank has established for country risk adminis-
tration; and (3) the effect of country risk on the overall quality of the
international loan portfolio. Bank examiners expect three basic
components in every bank's country risk management system:
(1) evaluation of economic, political, and social trends in countries
where the bank has asset exposures; (2) country exposure limits es-
tablished by executive bank management; and (3) current, accurate,
and complete internal reporting systems to monitor and control
country risk. Finally, the examiners inspect a bank's reports, com-
mittee minutes, and other records to determine the quality and fre-
quency of a bank's country evaluations, the quality of internal
country exposure reporting, and the bank's compliance with its own
internal limits.
These factors taken together enable the banking supervisor to
reach an overall assessment of the degree of risk in a bank's interna-
tional lending and other international activities, and to determine
whether any corrective supervisory action-informal or formal-is
necessary.
III. Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves (ATRR)
The agencies' proposal to establish a system of special reserves
for international loans that had not been serviced for an extended
39 See COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL BANK EXAMINERS, §§ 205-19, 805-09.
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period was adopted, essentially unchanged, by the Senate.40 The
House version, however, would have required that uniform reserves
be established for loans in need of rescheduling, a much broader
standard than that proposed by the agencies. 4' Recognizing the ad-
verse impact the House provision would have on the needed contin-
uation of international lending, Congress ultimately adopted the
Senate version, based upon the agencies' proposal. Under this ver-
sion,42 each federal banking agency must require the banks under its
supervision to establish and maintain a special reserve whenever, in
the agency's judgment, the quality of certain loans made by the bank
has been impaired by a protracted inability of public or private sector
borrowers in a foreign country to make payments on their external
indebtedness as indicated by various factors. Such factors include
failure to comply with the terms of a restructuring, or the absence of
definite prospects for the orderly restoration of debt service. Thus,
reserves are not required for most LDC loans because, in most cases,
there are either definite prospects for the orderly restoration of debt
service, or the country is complying with either the terms of a re-
structuring agreement or with an IMF or other suitable adjustment
program. In addition, most such borrowers have made strenuous ef-
forts to continue to meet their interest payments while restructuring
their debt obligations.43
40 S. REP., supra note 4, at 13-14. "The bill provides that each appropriate federal
banking agency shall require a banking institution to establish and maintain a special re-
serve whenever, in the judgment of the agency, the institution's exposure in a particular
country has become subject to a level of transfer risk that indicates a protracted inability of
borrowers to make schedule payments on external indebtedness." Id. at 14.
41 H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 40. The House version required "that the agencies
establish a uniform loan reserve standard and phase-in schedule for loans where there is a
substantial likelihood the loan will not be repaid as expected without additional borrowing
or major restructuring." Id.
42 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
43 Arguably, the House version of the special reserve provision should have been
adopted; that is, banks should be forced to reserve against or write down loans subject to
multiple rescheduling agreements. The theories behind this argument are that such loans
are not marketable at face value and should not be carried as such on the books of the
bank, and that, but for subsequent reschedulings, the borrower would not have been able
to comply with the terms of the original rescheduling and the loans would then have been
subject to a special reserve.
This argument, however, overlooks several important points. First, the special re-
serve provision does not replace or detract from the general obligation of banks and their
auditors to assure that a bank establishes and maintains a loan loss reserve adequate to
provide for potential losses. In the past few years, U.S. banks, including the multinationals
most involved in international lending, have substantially increased their capital, including
loan loss reserves. Thus, the fact that loans to a particular LDC are not subject to a special
reserve does not mean that no provision has been made against potential losses arising
from them. Secondly, bank loans generally are not required to be, and are not, "marked
to market." Nor are restructured loans necessarily required to be written down. Finally, it
is often anticipated that multiple reschedulings will occur, to take account of both changes
in the economic condition of the borrower, including improvements, and changes in mar-




The joint regulations required by section 3904(c) were pub-
lished in final form by the agencies on February 13, 1984. 44 These
regulations incorporate the statutory standards for determining
when a special reserve should be required. Essentially, the purpose
of such a reserve is to reflect the transfer risk and diminished value
of international loans which have not been serviced over an extended
period of time. Under current procedure, a reserve requirement is
imposed by a joint decision of the agencies on those international
assets that have been classified for transfer risk reasons as "Value
Impaired" by the ICERC. The minimum ATRR amounts are deter-
mined jointly by the agencies on a regular basis.45
Not all loans outstanding to borrowers in a particular country
are necessarily covered by the reserve. For example, loans guaran-
teed elsewhere or loans in local currency matched by local currency
liabilities, as well as other types of credit, such as short-term trade
financings, often are excluded from the reserve requirement. In ad-
dition, the reserve does not automatically apply to new loans made
to borrowers in the country. Rather, such loans are later evaluated
on their merits in accordance with their servicing history.
The reserves generally are established at a rate of 10% of the
loan amounts outstanding during the first year and 15% in subse-
quent years. 46 No reserve is required if the bank already has written
down the amounts of the loans by an equivalent percentage. 47 In
accordance with the statute, these reserves must be established by a
charge against income, and they are not considered as part of capital
and surplus or the allowance for possible loan losses.48 Accordingly,
the normal practice of banks is to charge-off or write down that per-
centage of the loan subject to reserves, in lieu of creating the special
reserve. If, subsequently, there is improvement in the quality of the
loans or if in subsequent evaluations they are classified less severely,
additional percentage reserves may not be required and/or the agen-
cies can allow banks to reverse the reserves.
Since passage of the statute and promulgation of the regula-
tions, the agencies have required reserves in several instances. Like
other examination information and classifications, country debt clas-
sifications are not publicly disclosed. Rather, banks having outstand-
ing loans subject to the reserves are notified individually by their
supervisory agency.
The Allocated Transfer Risk Reserve system was not intended
to, and does not substitute for the obligation of banks and their audi-
44 See 49 Fed. Reg. 5,586-93 (1984) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8, 211.43, 351.1).
45 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 20.8(b) (1986).
46 See id. § 20.8(b)(2)(ii)(B).
47 Id. § 20.8(c)(4).
48 Id. § 20.8(c)(1).
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tors to appropriately value and reserve against possible losses in
their loan portfolio. Moreover, the statute also requires that each
banking agency analyze the results of foreign loan rescheduling ne-
gotiations, assess the loan loss risk reflected in rescheduling agree-
ments, and ensure that the capital and reserve positions of U.S.
banks are adequate to accommodate potential losses on their foreign
loans.49 Accordingly, while the system of special reserves does as-
sure that provision is made for the most likely international loan
losses, both banks and the agencies are attentive to the need to in-
crease bank capital to provide for the remaining risks.
IV. Accounting for Fees on International Loans
Both Congress and the agencies were concerned that the bank
practice of accounting for fees received in connection with interna-
tional loans as income in the year received provided an artificial in-
centive for banks to make international loans without consideration
of their longer-term consequences. 50 Therefore, Congress adopted
the applicable portion of the agencies' five-point program and re-
quired that the agencies promulgate regulations dealing with bank
accounting for fees received in connection with international loans. 5'
In accordance with the statute, the rules apply to both fees associated
with the restructuring of international loans, and fees charged by
banks in connection with all other international loans. Therefore,
unlike the statutory and regulatory provisions concerning special
reserves, which are limited to loans to borrowers in countries exper-
iencing severe foreign exchange shortages and foreign debt repay-
ment problems, the statute and rules on accounting for fees
encompass all international loans, including those to borrowers in
the industrial countries of the world.
The statute and the regulations distinguish, however, between
fees received in connection with a restructuring and those received
in conjunction with other international loans. For restructured
loans, the rules are rather strict: all fees in excess of administrative
costs must be amortized over the term of the loan.5 2 A restructuring
is not an ordinary refinancing. Rather, a restructuring within the
meaning of the rules occurs when a foreign country reschedules pub-
49 12 U.S.C. § 3904(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
50 S. REP., supra note 4, at 14-15. "In general, under these rules or regulations, any
portion of a fee that is deemed to represent interest income should be amortized over the
effective life of the loan, recognizing that the effective life may differ from the loan's stated
term." Id.; H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 31. Banks have "a tendency . . . to behave in an
almost herd-like fashion much of the time and to have difficulty assessing longer term
supply-demand relationships." Id.
51 12 U.S.C. § 3905(b)(3) (Supp. I 1984). The agencies' jointly-promulgated final
regulations appeared at 49 Fed. Reg, 12,192 (1984) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.9, 211.45,
351.2 (1986)).
52 See 12 C.F.R. § 20.9(a) (1986).
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lic, and generally private debt, due to the general inability of public
and private sector obligors to timely meet their external debt obliga-
tions because of a lack of or restraints on the availability of foreign
exchange in that country. A restructuring consists of either ex-
tending the original schedule of payments or reducing the stated in-
terest rate, or loaning new funds to the borrower so that the existing
debt may be serviced or refinanced. 53
With respect to other international loans, the rules require that
all fees, including a portion of syndication fees, that represent an
adjustment to yield be treated as interest and amortized over the
loan period.5 4 Commitment fees, however, are treated differently.
They are taken into income over the term of the commitment period
alone. 55 Agency fees also are separately treated. The rules provide
that such fees are to be recognized as income at the time of the loan
closing or as the service is performed.5 6 Although the fee account-
ing rules are, for the most part, in accordance with Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), Congress intended that they
not govern accounting or disclosures under the federal securities
law.5 7
V. Collection and Disclosure of International Lending Data
Like the rules on accounting for fees, the rules on collection and
disclosure of international lending data apply to all international
loans and not merely those to troubled LDC debtors. In accordance
with the agencies' proposal, the statute requires that each bank with
foreign country exposure submit, no fewer than four times each cal-
endar year, information regarding such exposure. The information
must be in a format prescribed by agency regulations. 58 In addition,
banks must disclose information to the public regarding material for-
eign country exposure in relation to assets and capital. 59
The banking agencies' joint final rules on reporting and disclo-
sure of international assets require banks to submit, at least quar-
terly, information on the amounts and composition of their
53 Id. § 2 0 .7 (g).
54 Id. § 20.9(b), (d).
55 Id. § 20.9(e). This treatment of commitment fees does not apply to restructured
international loans. In connection with such loans, commitment fees, like all other fees
which do not represent administrative costs, must be amortized over the term of the loan.
56 Id. § 20.9(0.
57 S. REP., supra note 4, at 15. "The Committee ... has determined that nothing in
this legislation should be construed as setting disclosure requirements under the federal
securities laws or accounting principles for GAAP." Id.; H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 42.
"The Committee considered the possible impact of the legislation, specifically reserves
and fees, on the Federal securities laws and generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), and intends that nothing in this Act should be construed as setting disclosure
requirements under the Federal securities laws or accounting principles for GAAP." Id.
58 12 U.S.C. § 3906(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
59 Id. § 3906(b).
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international assets, as specified in the Instructions for Preparation of the
Country Exposure Report, (FFIEC Report 009).6o These reports break
down information on bank loans or other exposure to borrowers in
different foreign countries by both types of borrower, public sector
or private sector, and by maturity. A separate portion of the report,
available to the public, sets forth information on concentrations that
are considered material in respect to total assets and capital. This
pertinent information includes details regarding exposures exceed-
ing 1% of the bank's assets as well as more generalized information
on exposures ranging between three-quarters and one percent of the
bank's assets. 6 '
VI. Foreign Loan Evaluations
Due to concern that U.S. banks' financing of foreign mines and
metal fabricating plants may have contributed to a surplus of certain
metal commodities and adversely affected U.S. industries, the House
proposed, and Congress adopted a provision in ILSA requiring bank
economic evaluations of such projects. 62 As a part of their normal
credit analyses, banks routinely evaluate the economic prospects for
projects financed with bank loans. The statutory provision makes
such evaluations mandatory in the case of certain types of projects
and further specifies factors which must be considered and included
in such evaluations. 63 This statutory requirement is not limited to
loans made to LDCs. Rather, an economic feasibility evaluation is
required by the statute for any project in which one or more U.S.
banks extend credit which either individually or in the aggregate ex-
ceeds 20 million dollars "to finance any project which has as a major
objective the construction or operation of any mining operation, any
metal or mineral primary processing operation, any fabricating facil-
ity or operation, or any metal-making operations (semi and finished)
located outside the United States or its territories and possessions
"'64
The evaluation is to be prepared and approved in writing by a
senior official of the bank, or by a senior official of the lead bank if
60 49 Fed. Reg. 5,586-87 (1984) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.10 (OCC), 211.44
(FRB), 351.3 (FDIC) (1986)). This supervisory survey requires all U.S.-insured banks with
at least one foreign branch (including an International Banking Facility) and foreign assets
exceeding $30 million to report their foreign assets by broad categories on a global con-
solidated basis to their federal banking supervisor. The banking agencies publish the sur-
vey data in aggregate form. The banking agencies also computerize and analyze the data
by bank and by peer groups for internal supervisory purposes, including use by bank
examiners.
61 For analogous public disclosure requirements applicable to publicly-held bank
holding companies see 17 C.F.R. pt. 231 (1986) (Guide 3-Statistical Disclosures by Bank
Holding Companies, III. C. 3).
62 12 U.S.C. § 3908 (Supp. 11 1984).
63 Id.
64 Id. § 3908(a)(1).
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more than one bank is involved, prior to the making of the loan.6 5
The evaluation must include the profit potential of the project, the
impact of the project on world markets, the inherent competitive ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the project over its entire life, and the
likely effect of the project upon the overall long-term economic de-
velopment of the country in which it is located. In addition, the eval-
uation must consider whether the loan can be repaid from revenues
generated by the project without regard to any subsidy provided by
any government. 66 The evaluations are to be reviewed during the
course of bank examinations. 67
The statutory language is not a model of clarity in specifying
which projects require an evaluation. For example, is an auto body
manufacturing plant a finished metal-making operation? The agen-
cies have not yet issued any interpretations concerning this section.
However, because economic feasibility evaluations normally are
done for all major project loans and because the statute specifically
excludes a private right of action, 68 this section should not result in
problems for the banking industry.
VII. Conclusion
ILSA and the rules issued thereunder build upon and enhance
the agencies' existing programs and policies for the supervision of
international lending by U.S. banks. . Because the majority of ILSA
provisions apply to international loans wherever made, it is impor-
tant that the statute and implementing rules be reviewed and consid-
ered in the context of all international loans.
C5 Id.
66 Id. § 3908(a)(2).
67 Id. § 3908(b).
68 Id. § 3908(c)(2).
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